Opacity - Further Insights on an Information Flow Property by Ryan PYA & Peacock T
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
University of Newcastle upon Tyne 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
COMPUTING 
SCIENCE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Opacity - Further Insights on an Information Flow Property 
 
P. Y. A. Ryan, T. Peacock. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TECHNICAL REPORT SERIES 
              
 
No. CS-TR-958 April, 2006 
NEWCASTLE
UN IVERS ITY OF
TECHNICAL REPORT SERIES 
              
 
No. CS-TR-958  April, 2006 
 
 
 
Opacity - Further Insights on an Information Flow Property 
 
 
P. Y. A. Ryan, T. Peacock. 
 
Abstract 
 
In [1], [2], [3] Bryans et al define a security property known as opacity. In this paper, 
we investigate possible relationships between opacity and several existing definitions 
for information flow, namely noninterference [8], [9], non-inference [15], non-
deducibility [20] and nonleakage [21]. We show that non-interference implies 
opacity, and that non-inference is equivalent to opacity. We also show that the 
remaining two properties can be cast directly as opacity. Here, we refer to suitably 
defined forms of opacity. This work indicates the potential flexibility of opacity, and 
establishes its distinct characteristics. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© 2006 University of Newcastle upon Tyne. 
Printed and published by the University of Newcastle upon Tyne, 
Computing Science, Claremont Tower, Claremont Road, 
Newcastle upon Tyne, NE1 7RU, England. 
Bibliographical details 
 
RYAN, P. Y. A., PEACOCK, T.. 
 
Opacity - Further Insights on an Information Flow Property  
[By] P. Y. A. Ryan, T. Peacock. 
 
Newcastle upon Tyne: University of Newcastle upon Tyne: Computing Science, 2006. 
 
(University of Newcastle upon Tyne, Computing Science, Technical Report Series, No. CS-TR-958) 
 
Added entries 
 
UNIVERSITY OF NEWCASTLE UPON TYNE 
Computing Science. Technical Report Series.  CS-TR-958 
 
 
Abstract 
 
In [1], [2], [3] Bryans et al define a security property known as opacity. In this paper, we investigate possible 
relationships between opacity and several existing definitions for information flow, namely non-interference [8], 
[9], non-inference [15], non-deducibility [20] and nonleakage [21]. We show that non-interference implies 
opacity, and that non-inference is equivalent to opacity. We also show that the remaining two properties can be 
cast directly as opacity. Here, we refer to suitably defined forms of opacity. This work indicates the potential 
flexibility of opacity, and establishes its distinct characteristics. 
 
About the author 
 
Peter Ryan is a Professor of CSR. He is responsible for the security and privacy aspects of the DIRC program and 
is involved in the European MAFTIA project. Prior to joining the CSR, he conducted research in formal methods 
and information assurance at GCHQ, CESG, DERA, SRI Cambridge, the Norwegian Computing Centre Oslo and 
the Software Engineering Institute, Carnegie Mellon University. Before migrating into information assurance he 
was a theoretical physicist and holds a BSc in Theoretical Physics and a PhD in Mathematical Physics from the 
University of London for research in quantum gravity. He has published numerous articles; the most recent being 
"Mathematical Models of Computer Security," a chapter in LNCS 2171, is based on lectures given at the FOSAD 
2000 Summer School. He is co-author of the book "Modelling and Analysis of Security Protocols," Pearson 2001.  
Thea Peacock is a PhD student within the school of Computing Science, Newcastle University. 
 
 
Suggested keywords 
 
SECURITY,  
INFORMATION FLOW,  
OPACITY 
Opacity - Further Insights on an Information
Flow Property
Peter Y. A. Ryan and Thea Peacock
School of Computing Science, University of Newcastle,
Newcastle upon Tyne, NE1 7RU, United Kingdom
peter.ryan@ncl.ac.uk, t.peacock@ncl.ac.uk
Abstract. In [1], [2], [3] Bryans et al define a security property known
as opacity. In this paper, we investigate possible relationships between
opacity and several existing definitions for information flow, namely non-
interference [8], [9], non-inference [15], non-deducibility [20] and non-
leakage [21]. We show that non-interference implies opacity, and that
non-inference is equivalent to opacity. We also show that the remaining
two properties can be cast directly as opacity. Here, we refer to suitably
defined forms of opacity. This work indicates the potential flexibility of
opacity, and establishes its distinct characteristics.
1 Introduction
Defining secure information flow in computer systems is a difficult problem that
has been researched for nearly three decades. The meaning of secrecy is itself
difficult to define, as it depends on the properties required of the system, and
the extent to which they should be satisfied. Adding to the difficulty are the
complexity of interactions between processes in a system, and wide variety in
operational environments. The existing definitions for information flow are still
much debated, and while there have been many proposals, the consensus on a
“correct” definition has not yet been reached. As systems become more sophis-
ticated, and distributed computing more prevalent, such a definition is likely to
become even more elusive.
One of the more recent definitions for secure information flow is known as
opacity. The term may have originated in the work of Hughes et al [12], in
which “opaqueness” on function views describe partial knowledge of a system.
Subsequently, Mazare´ used the term “opacity” to describe the inability of an
observer to establish the truth of a predicate over system traces [13]. Although
both ideas are strongly related, the second is closest to the present work. Opacity
has since been given a rigorous, formal treatment by Bryans et al [1], [2], [3].
Intuitively, a predicate over system behaviours, φ, is opaque to the environ-
ment if for every run in which φ is true, there exists an indistinguishable run in
which it is false, where a run can be regarded as a sequence of behaviours. φ can
represent some property of the system, typically regarding internal states due
to the actions of High-level users. This gives opacity the ability to capture the
security requirements of a wide range of different applications. One of the great
advantages of the opacity framework is its generality: not only can the predicate
be altered to reflect a property of concern, but also the power of the observer.
This will become clearer later, when we provide a formal definition.
Indistinguishability may be defined in many ways. In the original papers [1], [2], [3]
it is defined simply as trace equivalence. In the semantics of process algebra, two
processes are trace equivalent if they have the same set of observable behaviours.
A stronger notion is observational equivalence, in which two processes are have
the same behaviour, taking internal events and hence, non-determinism, into ac-
count [11]. Whether or not trace equivalence provides a sufficiently robust model
is a decision for the system designer. We return to this issue later.
Our primary aim in this paper is to test the flexibility of opacity, and
also to examine its characteristics via possible mappings to several other exist-
ing security properties, namely, non-interference [8], non-deducibility [20], non-
inference [15] and non-leakage [21]. We show that opacity can be used to define
a class of information flow properties parametised by the predicate, φ, and the
observation function.
Formulating non-interference as opacity proves difficult, but we can show
that non-interference implies opacity. We also show that opacity is equivalent
to non-inference, and that both non-deducibility and non-leakage can be cast as
variations of opacity. Note that in each case, the predicate, φ, must be suitably
defined. For example, with non-interference and non-inference, we define φ in
terms of the set of High-level events which should be hidden from the Low-level
observer, i.e.,
φH (t) = True, where t contains a High-level event.
However, as seen later, we need to define φ differently when casting both
non-deducibility and non-leakage as opacity.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Existing work on opacity is recalled
in Section 2. This is followed by discussions on the mappings between opacity
and non-interference in Section 3, non-deducibility in Section 5, non-inference
in Section 6 and non-leakage in Section 7. In Section 4, we define a variant of
opacity, symmetric opacity, and consider the possibility of its relationship to non-
interference. There are also informal discussions of mappings between opacity
and non-deducibility on strategies [22] and opacity and non-influence [21]. We
discuss possible future work and present our conclusions in Section 8.
2 Opacity
In this section, we formalise the definition of opacity, along with some related
notions that we will refer to in later sections. Initially, Bryans et al base their
framework on Petri nets [2], [3]. However, to obtain a more general model, they
later switch to labelled transition systems. Full details can be found in [1].
The labelled transition system is defined below.
Definition 1 A labelled transition system (LTS) is a tuple Π = (S ,S0,L, ∆),
where S is the (possibly infinite) set of states, L, is the (possibly infinite) set
of labels, ∆ ⊆ S × L × S, is the transition relation, and S0 is the set of initial
states. We consider the underlying LTS to be deterministic and so for transitions
(s, l , s ′), (s, l , s ′′) ∈ ∆ it is the case that s ′ = s ′′.
This provides a very general model to which other formalisms may be adapted.
We found it convenient, for example, to use the process algebra CSP [11] for
some of the work later in this paper. Note that a non-deterministic system can
be modelled as an abstraction of the underlying deterministic LTS.
The earlier, intuitive statement of opacity is expressed over the runs of an
LTS, which can be defined as follows:
Definition 2 A run of the LTS is a pair (s0, λ), where s0 ∈ S0, λ = l1 . . . ln , li ∈
L, is a finite sequence of labels such that there are states s1, . . . , sn satisfying
(si−1, li , si) ∈ ∆ for i = 1, . . . , n .
For rest of this section, let the LTS, Π, be given by (S ,S0,L, ∆,Θ), where
Θ is a set of elements called observables.
We next define an observation function which can be used to model the ability
of an observer to gain information about the system.
Definition 3 Any function obs: run(Π) → Θ∗ is an observation function. It
can be called label-based and static if there is a mapping obs ′ : L→ Θ ∪ 〈〉 where
〈〉 is the empty trace given by t a 〈〉 ≡ t, and such that for every run (s, λ) ∈ Π,
obs(s, λ) = obs(l1) ∧ . . . ∧ obs ′(ln), where λ = l1 . . . ln .
Static functions only allow the observer to observe the same label in the same
way. Dynamic, orwellian, m-orwellian and state-based functions have also been
defined, but will not be needed in this paper. See [1] for further details.
We are interested in determining whether an observer can establish the truth
of φ, a predicate over system states and traces, only from the result of an ob-
servation function, obs, for a particular execution. The concern is whether the
observer can deduce that an observed execution belongs to the set of runs for
which φ holds. This leads to the following general definition for opacity, which
can be varied according to the requirements of the particular application.
Definition 4 A predicate φ over run(Π) is opaque w.r.t. the observation func-
tion obs if, for every run (s, λ) ∈ φ there is a run (s ′, λ′) /∈ φ such that
obs(s, λ) = obs(s ′, λ′).
It is worth noting that opacity is an asymmetric property, i.e., from an ob-
served execution of the system, we are only interested in whether an observer can
establish that the underlying run belongs to φ. If, instead, we were interested in
establishing whether the underlying run does not belong to φ, we would consider
instead the property φ = run(LTS ) \ φ.
3 Non-interference as Opacity
Drawing on earlier work by Cohen [4] and Feiertag [6], Goguen et al’s non-
interference is one of the first attempts at addressing the problem of covert
channels [8], [9]. Following the original intuition [8], which was based on a de-
terministic state machine, non-interference can be defined as follows
∀ t ∈ I ∗, c ∈ C ∗, outL(t , c) = outL(purgeH (t), c)
where C is the set of commands, outL(t , c) a function that gives the output
to Low after an input sequence, t , and (event) command c, and purgeH (t) a
function that removes all High-level commands from t . Put in words, a system is
non-interfering if no High-level commands affect what observations a Low-level
user can make of the system.
Although there have been several proposals for non-deterministic non-interference [19], [17], [7],
note that in the following, we refer to the original, deterministic non-interference
as defined by Goguen et al [8],[9].
It may appear, at first, that non-interference can be cast as opacity. Translat-
ing the intuitive definition into opacity terms, for all runs of a system, there is an
observationally equivalent run without any High events. However, as illustrated
by a simple process, P , in Figure 1, this is a weaker notion than non-interference.
P satisfies opacity, since, for every trace with a High event, there is a correspond-
ing trace without. However, P does not satisfy non-interference. On observing
the event, l2, for example, Low can eliminate h1.
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Fig. 1. A process P which satisfies opacity
To satisfy non-interference, P could be modified as shown in Figure 2. Low is
now prevented from ruling out any High events, and so High does not interfere
with Low. At the same time, opacity still holds for P . This suggests that non-
interference is a stronger property than opacity, and that non-interference implies
opacity, but that the converse is not true.
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Fig. 2. A process P which satisfies non-interference
3.1 Proof
Theorem. non-interference implies opacity on the predicate φH (t), but that the
converse is not true. As given previously, φH (t) = True, if t ¹ H 6= 〈〉, where
t ¹ H is the High-level projection of a trace of the system, t .
First, we introduce a few CSP notions. Full details on CSP can be found
in [11] and a general introduction in [18]. The interface to a process P is repre-
sented by its alphabet, αP , the set of externally visible events through which it
interacts with the environment. For deterministic processes, the set of events that
it will offer the environment after a given trace will be well-defined. Since only
deterministic processes are considered here, the initials can be used, rather than
refusal or acceptance sets. The initials of P are the events that P is prepared to
participate in next, defined as
initials(P) = {a | 〈a〉 ∈ traces(P)}
For notational convenience, the initials are restricted to a subset of the alpha-
bet, for example, the set of Low-level events, L. InitL are the initials restricted
to L.
The non-interference of Goguen et al can now be cast in the following way:
A deterministic process S is non-interfering if and only if
∀ t ∈ τS , InitL(S/t) = InitL(S/(t ¹ L))
where S/t denotes the process S after it has performed the trace t . Note that
purgeH (t) ≡ t ¹ L, assuming a H and L partition of αP .
Strictly speaking, this is more general than the original definition, as Goguen
et al simply required that next, low outputs be a single event, rather than a set,
and assumed that these were unique for a given input sequence.
Next, the Purge Closure Property (PCP) is defined. This states that a process
P satisfies PCP if and only if for all traces of P , τP , the purge of a trace is a valid
trace of P , where “purge” means that all High level events have been removed.
In other words, for any trace with High-level events, there is a valid trace with
the same sequence of Low level events, but no High events. Formally,
∀ t ∈ τP , purgeH (t) ∈ τP
The proof that non-interference(NI) implies opacity(φH ) can be summarised
as follows:
PCP ⇐ NI and opacity(φH ) ⇔ PCP , but PCP 6⇒ NI . Hence NI ⇒
opacity(φH ) but opacity(φH ) 6⇒ NI .
The proof can be split into two main steps. The first step is to show that
non-interference implies the PCP, that is,
NI (S )⇒ (t ∈ τS ⇒ purgeH (t) ∈ τS )
.
Proof. Assume S satisfies NI. S is also shown to satisfy the PCP by contra-
diction. Suppose S satisfies non-interference but not the PCP. There must then
exist a smallest trace of S that violates the PCP, since traces form a well-ordered
set. It is convenient to represent this smallest “PCP-offending trace” as t a 〈e〉,
i.e., the trace t followed by a single event, e, with 〈e〉 ∈ L. Thus
t a 〈e〉 ∈ τS ∧ e ∈ L but purgeH (t a 〈e〉) /∈ τS ,
since e ∈ L, purgeH (t a 〈e〉) = purgeH (t)a 〈e〉.
Since it was assumed that t a 〈e〉 was minimal, then purgeH (t) ∈ τS .
So e /∈ InitL(purgeH (t)), but e ∈ InitL(t), which contradicts the assumption
that S satisfies non-interference.
2
The fact that PCP is implies a suitably defined opacity property and vice
versa, i.e., PCP ⇔ opacity(φH ) follows directly from the simple lemma:
Lemma. The system, for a given y ,
(y ¹ L = x ¹ L) ∧ x ¹ H = 〈〉
always has the unique solution
x = purgeH (y)
where x , y are sequences from A = L ∪H , i.e., x , y ∈ A∗.
The proof of the lemma follows by straightforward induction. Here, opacity
will be defined with φH (t) := t ¹ H 6= 〈〉 and obsL(t) = t ¹ L
2The next step is to prove that PCP 6⇒ NI .
Proof. This is done by the counter-example given in Figure 1. P satisfies the
PCP but not non-interference. The occurrence of h1 prevents l2. Note that if the
Low-level user observes either l1 or l2 it is possible that h1 did not occur.
2
It has now been established that NI ⇒ PCP and that PCP ⇔ opacity(φH ).
Therefore, the final step of the proof, NI ⇒ opacity(φH ) follows by transi-
tivity.
2
4 Symmetric Opacity
As mentioned earlier, opacity is an asymmetric property in that the concern is
only whether the observer is able to establish φ, or alternatively, φ = run(LTS )\
φ.
Trying to get closer to casting non-interference in terms of opacity, we next
consider a variation of opacity, symmetric opacity, and its relationship to non-
interference.
Definition 5 A system (Π) satisfies symmetric opacity with respect to φ and
the observation function obs if, for every run (s, λ), both φ and φ are opaque.
Intuitively, for any system trace, t, the observer should not be able to estab-
lish either φ(t) or φ(t).
In the definition above, if φ is defined as being true of a trace if it contains
High-level events, the Low-level observer should not be able to establish whether
or not a High-level event has occurred. This suggests that it may be possible
to cast non-interference as symmetric opacity. However, by way of a counter-
example, we show that this not to be the case. In Figure 3, P satisfies symmetric
opacity with respect to both φ and φ, but not non-interference.
5 Non-deducibility
One of the first attempts at defining non-deterministic information flow was
proposed by Sutherland in [20]. It was originally defined as follows.
“Given a set of possible worldsW and two functions f 1, f 2 with domainW ,
information flows from f 1 to f 2 if and only if there exists some possible world
w and some element z in the range of f 2 such that z is achieved by f 2 in some
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Fig. 3. A process P which satisfies symmetric opacity but not non-interference
possible world but in every possible world w ′ such that f 1(w ′) = f 2(w), f 2(w ′)
is not equal to z” [20].
Intuitively, Low observations should not allow Low to narrow the set of pos-
sible High-level inputs. Another way of stating this, in CSP notation [19], is that
for two users, High, H , and Low, L, and for all possible pairs of traces of the
system, t , t ′ ∈ τS , there exists a trace t ′′ such that
t ¹ H = t ′′ ¹ H ∧ t ′ ¹ L = t ′′ ¹ L
.
In other words, the trace, t ′′ should be compatible with both High inputs in
t and Low’s observation of t ′. Similar definitions have been proposed, e.g. in [5].
A problem with the original form of non-deducibility is that it is only con-
cerned with High-level inputs. Sutherland reasoned that nothing significant could
be learned from High-level outputs if they are not controlled by High-level in-
puts. Guttman et al later showed this to be false. For example, High could adapt
his inputs according to his outputs in such a way as to signal to Low. They pro-
posed a modification of non-deducibility, which they called non-deducibility on
outputs [10]. Informally stated, any Low-level observation should be compatible
with any possible High-level inputs and outputs. This is essentially a restatement
of non-deducibility, but covers both High inputs and outputs.
In the following, we show that non-deducibility on outputs can be cast as
opacity, with H denoting the set of High inputs and outputs.
First, a predicate, φt , is defined as
φt(t ′) := t ¹ H 6= t ′ ¹ H
.
That is, φt is true of a trace t ′ precisely when the High-level projection of t ′
is not equal to the High-level projection of t .
The static obs function obsL is defined as
obsL(e) = e if e ∈ L
obsL(e) = 〈〉 if e ∈ H , where α(S ) is partitioned into L and H.
Theorem: A system, S , satisfies opacity w.r.t. φt and obsL ⇔ S satisfies
non-deducibility on outputs.
Proof. S satisfies opacity w.r.t. φt and obsL iff
∀ t ∈ τ(S ) · φt is opaque.
Expanding this definition gives:
∀ t , t ′ ∈ τ(S ), ∃ t ′′ such that
φt(t ′′) = F ∧ obsH (t) = obsH (t ′)
or
∀ t , t ′ ∈ τ(S ), ∃ t ′′ such that
(t ¹ H = t ′′ ¹ H ) ∧ (t ′ ¹ L = t ′′ ¹ L)
which matches the earlier definition of non-deducibility on outputs.
2
Another problem with non-deducibility, as demonstrated in [22], is that it
allows covert channels. It appears that non-deducibility on outputs also suffers
from this vulnerability. Wittbold et al proposed a further modification which
they called non-deducibility on strategies, where a strategy for a process, either
High or Low-level, determines an input from a given sequence of previous inputs
and outputs. Intuitively, any Low-level observation should be consistent with
any High-level strategy, and for consistency to hold, there must be a trace that
is compatible with both.
It is possible also that non-deducibility on strategies can be cast as opacity
using the formulation above, but with H denoting High strategies. This would
be interesting to investigate in the future.
6 Non-inference as Opacity
Another proposal for a non-deterministic security property is non-inference [15].
In [14], McLean defines several information flow properties as functions of “trace
sets”, or sequences of High and Low inputs and outputs. Non-inference is de-
scribed as “the property that is satisfied by a trace set σ if and only if it is closed
under purge” [14]. The purge function effectively removes all High level events
from a trace, which coincides with the function, purgeH , given above. For details
of McLean’s framework, the reader is referred to [14].
Recall that from the proofs given in Section 3, opacity w.r.t. φH implies
the Purge Closure Property (PCP) and vice versa, which is in agreement with
McLean’s work [14]. From this we can conclude that opacity on the predicate,
φH , implies non-inference and vice versa.
7 Non-leakage as Initial Opacity
Introduced by von Oheimb in [21], non-leakage expresses confidentiality over
a set of initial information. Informally, an observer, u, should not be able to
distinguish between any two states s, s ′, if, during the course of a trace, t , caused
by an action a from s, s ′, no domains have been allowed to interfere directly or
indirectly with u.
By assigning actions to domains, the definition captures intransitive infor-
mation flow.
If actions are not assigned to domains, or if individual actions are not dis-
tinguished, then weak non-leakage can be applied. Intuitively, for any action
sequence of length α, u may only be influenced by specified domains up to a
chain length α. Weak transitive non-leakage may be appropriate if actions are
not assigned to domains and α is not of interest. Essentially, if u cannot distin-
guish between two initial states, then u is unable to do so after any sequence of
actions. Full details can be found in [21].
Currently in the opacity framework, we only assume transitive flow, i.e.,
no information should flow from a High to Low level, without the possibility of
“downgrading” High-level information, and thereby making it accessible to Low.
This being the case, a special case of non-leakage, that is, defined for transitive
flow and deterministic systems, can be cast as opacity. More precisely, with the
predicate, φi , defined as being true if it contains the initial state, i , we can
model a system which satisfies opacity w.r.t. a set of initial information. The
following formalises the relationship between a special case of non-leakage and
this variation of opacity.
Let Si denote a system, S , starting in an initial state i ∈ I , where I is the
set of initial events of S .
Definition 6 S is defined as non-leaking if
∀ i , j ∈ I · i ∼ j ⇔ Si ≈ Sj .
Note that “ ≈′′ is a suitable process equivalence, for example,
S ≈ Q ⇔ S \H ∼traces Q \H
Observe that the events i , j have not been specified as either High or Low-
level, so the equivalence holds for all observers, including High. This follows von
Oheimb’s definition [21], but may sometimes be too strong a requirement.
For a deterministic system, Sˆ , “≈” in the definition can denote trace equiv-
alence. Otherwise, as discussed previously, other forms of equivalence may be
necessary to deal with non-determinism in the system.
Below, a special case of opacity is defined, in which the initial states are
opaque, i.e., ∀ i ∈ I , φi is opaque. Note that opacity over initial events is termed
initial-opacity in [1].
Definition 7 Let φi(tr)⇔6 ∃ t such that tr = i a t, i.e., tr does not start with
event i .
The initial states of S are opaque with respect to φi and obs if and only if
∀ i , j ∈ I , ∀ tr ∈ τSi
∃ tr ′ ∈ τSj such that φi(tr ′) = F ∧ obs(tr) = obs(tr ′),
The observation function here is trivial in the sense that it is the identity on
αS , the alphabet of S , i.e., obs = Id(αS ). In other words, no events are hidden
or identified. This would seem to be in accord with von Oheimb’s definition, but
it may be useful to extend this notion with generalisations in future work.
Transitive non-leakage can now be captured neatly as an opacity property.
To do so, we show that transitive non-leakage implies opacity on φi , that is,
Definition 6 ⇔ Definition 7.
Proof.
⇒
Suppose S satisfies Definition 6. Definition 6 is equivalent to
∀ i , j ∈ I , i ∼ j ⇒ ∀ tr ∈ τSi
∃ tr ′ ∈ τSj such that tr ¹ L = tr ′ ¹ L
Note that tr ¹ I = tr ′ ¹ I ⇔ obs(tr) = obs(tr ′)
The equivalence of the two definitions is now quite clear. Both are asserting
that for all i , j , and for any trace of Si there must be a trace of Sj that is
indistinguishable to Low.
2
Non-influence, also introduced in [21], is defined as non-interference plus non-
leakage. von Oheimb observes that non-leakage could be regarded as a special
case of non-interference where only the secrecy of initial states is important.
Similarly, non-interference could be regarded as special case of non-influence
where secrecy of initial events are not of concern [21]. However, he considers
all three properties best kept separate, as non-interference and non-leakage are
more primitive than non-influence, and both are useful depending on application
requirements. Likewise, the special case of opacity, defined above, is useful under
certain circumstances.
Although we have shown that non-leakage can be cast as a variation of opac-
ity, the same is not true of non-interference. Therefore, there would not seem to
be a straightforward relationship between non-influence and opacity.
8 Conclusion
This work, has provided further insights on opacity by investigating its relation-
ship to several existing definitions of secure information flow. We have shown
that non-interference implies a opacity on a predicate, φH , defined as being true
of a trace if it contains High events opacity(φH ), but that the reverse implication
is not true. As intuition might suggest, this indicates that non-interference is a
stronger property than opacity. On the other hand, both non-deducibility on
outputs and (a special case of) non-leakage can be cast as variations of opacity.
We have also shown that opacity(φH ) is equivalent to non-inference. In addition,
it may be possible to cast non-deducibility on strategies as opacity by defining
the predicate, φ, as being true if it contains a sequence of events by which High
passes information illegally to Low, i.e., a High strategy.
It is important to note that non-leakage can capture intransitive flow policies,
while opacity is currently limited to transitive information flows. However it has
been shown that intransitive non-leakage is a special case of the transitive [21],
which can be mapped to a variation of opacity, i.e., opacity over the set of initial
events. Non-influence, is defined as non-interference plus non-leakage. Our results
suggest that there is no direct mapping between non-influence and opacity.
Earlier, we noted that trace equivalence may be too weak a model for defini-
tions of secure information flow. Recall that the observation function, obs, can
be either label-oriented, state-oriented or both. It is feasible that a state- and
label-oriented obs could be used for stronger equivalence models, i.e., in which
not only actions, but also the result of actions are observable, and hence, stronger
definitions of security. It may also be possible to define intransitive opacity using
a dynamic, rather than static obs, e.g., by visibility aspects that depend on the
state of the system. Details of the various obs functions can be found in [1].
These would be both be useful extensions to the present framework.
As well as highlighting the subtleties and complexities of defining secure
information flow, we have tested the flexibility and versatility of opacity, and
established its distinct character. In [16], we extend this work by showing that
opacity can be used to express receipt-freeness and coercion-resistance in voting
systems. From our work so far, it appears that opacity can be adapted to capture
“weak” notions of information flow, such as non-inference, plausible deniability,
weak non-leakage, etc., and perhaps less well-suited to definitions of “strong”
properties, such as non-interference. In addition, opacity can be readily adapted
to the security requirements of different systems, which also demonstrates its
great utility. Together with the possible future extensions discussed above, we
hope to have contributed towards a richer, more useful opacity framework.
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